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Abstract 
 
Using cross-country data, this paper examines the influence of government 
transparency on changing views regarding nuclear energy before and after Japan’s 
natural and nuclear disasters of 2011. It was observed that in the majority of countries 
the rate of favoring nuclear energy declined after the disaster. However, empirical 
results have shown that this rate is less likely to decrease in a more transparent country, 
even after a disaster. This implies that views regarding nuclear energy were less elastic 
to the news of the Fukushima incident when people were more certain about nuclear 
energy prior to the Fukushima incident. 
 
Keywords: Natural disaster, Nuclear energy, Transparency 
JEL classification: D73, D82, H12, Q54  
 
 
 
3 
 
1. Introduction 
On March 11, 2011, one of the worst natural disasters in modern times hit 
Japan—a devastating earthquake accompanied by a tsunami. As a consequence, a 
number of serious accidents occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, 
resulting in nuclear leakage. This combination of disasters caused tremendous damage 
to the Japanese economy. Furthermore, economic globalization meant that the effects of 
the disaster were felt worldwide. In terms of the political consequences, approximately 
two weeks after the disaster, with nuclear energy becoming a hotly debated 
international topic, a German political party that opposed nuclear energy won their 
state election (Baden-Wurttemberg state). This result would indicate that Japan’s 
nuclear disaster has influenced views regarding nuclear energy in countries some 
distance from Japan. 
A growing number of researchers are investigating the outcomes of natural 
disasters (e.g., Skidmore and Toya 2002; Toya and Skidmore 2007; Yamamura 2010). 
Existing literature has shown that democratic nations and those with effective 
governments suffer less damage from natural disasters compared with other countries. 
(Kahn 2005; Escaleras et al., 2007). Eisensee and Stromberg (2007) have stated that 
information obtained through the news media can play a critical role in disaster relief. 
Berger (2010) found that in Germany, nuclear incidents such as Chernobyl can increase 
an individual’s concern for the environment. Both democratic institutions and the mass 
media play lead roles in ensuring that the preferences of citizens are reflected in policy 
(Besley and Burgess 2002).1 Education and media played significant roles in forming 
citizens' views regarding the events of September 11, 2001 (Gentzkow and Shapiro 
                                                   
1 Government transparency contributes to increasing economic efficiency (Alt and 
Lassen 2006; Bruns and Himmler 2011). 
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2004). The quality and quantity of information regarding nuclear energy was important 
in forming views about nuclear energy after the incident on March 11, 2011. Yamamura 
(2012) examined the role of media and its effect on the perceived safety of nuclear 
energy after the Fukushima accident. He provided evidence that, with the presence of a 
free media and higher levels of freedom of expression, citizens are less likely to agree 
that nuclear power plants are properly secured against accidents.   
Aside from private mass-media firms, the present paper also focuses on the role 
of government in providing sufficient information regarding nuclear energy to enable 
the public to form opinions. The Fukushima incident is considered to be a natural 
experiment to examine how an unpredicted event can change the views of citizens and 
the extent to which that influence depends on institution. The persuasion approach 
offers a useful framework with which to consider the role of government in providing 
information about nuclear energy (DellaVigna and Gentzkow 2010). According to the 
belief-based model of persuasion (DellaVigna and Gentzkow 2010), people would be less 
likely to be affected by news of the Fukushima incident if government had already 
provided sufficient information regarding nuclear energy. Islam (2006) developed an 
indicator that measures the frequency with which governments update data to be 
released to the public. The indicator is considered to represent government 
transparency (Islam 2006). Data regarding views on nuclear energy before and after the 
Fukushima incident in each county were sourced from WIN-Gallup International (2011). 
This paper used these data to investigate the effect of prior information provided by 
government on any changes in the views of citizens regarding nuclear energy before and 
after the Fukushima incident. The key finding is that people were less likely to be 
affected by the Fukushima incident if they had received more frequent government 
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updates, although the rate of favoring nuclear energy declined after the disaster in the 
majority of countries. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the simple 
empirical model. Data and regression equations are presented in Section 3. Section 4 
provides the estimation results and their interpretation. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Simple model and hypothesis 
 
To describe the empirical model in a simplistic form, I used a persuasion model 
framework. As shown by DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010), persuasion models are 
generally divided into two categories: belief-based models (Stigler 1961, Telser 1964) 
and preference-based models (Stigler and Becker 1977; Becker and Murphy 1993). In a 
belief-based model, which is largely based on Bayesian theory, the weaker the priors of 
the individuals who receive additional information, the greater the influence that the 
information will have on their beliefs. To put it differently, new information has a weak 
influence on the attitudes and behaviors of individuals who are close to certain about 
the state ex ante.  
The effects of receiving prior information are often examined in the domain of 
political persuasion (Prior 2006; Enikolopov et al. 2009). On this topic, Zaller (1992) 
found that the Iran-Contra affair did not change individuals’ views regarding Ronald 
Regan, partly because individuals had prior knowledge of his performance. The 
frequency with which governments update data to be released to the public can be 
considered the degree of prior knowledge regarding nuclear energy. When the 
Fukushima incident occurred, citizens received new information regarding nuclear 
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energy via various media sources, such as the Internet. The use of a belief-based 
framework model would be appropriate to analyze the subject matter of this study. 
Hence, in a manner similar to previous works of political persuasion, this paper 
attempts to explore the impact of the Fukushima incident on the views of individuals 
regarding nuclear energy. A simple empirical model would assume: 
 
view(0) = a0 + a1 x netben(0) + e,     (1) 
 
where view(0) are those favoring nuclear power after the incident and netben(0) is the 
perceived net benefits of nuclear power after the incident. The variable netben(0) also 
incorporates the perceived risk of a nuclear accident. We would expect a1 > 0, i.e., 
higher perceived net-benefits imply that more people favor nuclear power. In addition:  
 
netben(0) = netben(–1) + dnetben,     (2) 
 
where netben(–1) is the perceived net-benefits prior to the incident and dnetben is the 
perceived change in netben after the incident, i.e., dnetben = netben(0) – netben(–1). 
Note that the variables netben(i) and dnetben are unobservable. We can use view(–1) as 
a proxy for netben(–1) under the assumption that: 
 
netben(–1) = d0 + d1 x view(–1) + u,     (3) 
 
where d1 > 0. Further, under additional informational assumptions, to be discussed 
below, we can also assume that TRAN affects dnetben: 
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dnetben = c0 + c1 x TRAN + w.     (4) 
 
As will be discussed below, it is unclear what sign to expect for c1. However, 
substituting (2)–(4) into (1) and subtracting view (–1) on both sides, we get our 
estimated equation: 
 
view(0) – view(–1) = b0 + b1 x view(–1) + b2 x TRAN + r.     (5) 
 
It is unclear what signs to expect for b1 and b2 without further restrictions on the model. 
To obtain consistent estimates, however, w and u should be uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables used in (5).  
 
As previously mentioned, I believe that we can learn more about (4) and (5) by 
adding further informational structure to the model. To illustrate, let Q be a variable on 
the [0,1]-interval representing the degree of transparency, where Q = 1 is fully 
transparent and Q = 0 is entirely non-transparent (e.g., North Korea). Then, Q can be 
interpreted as the amount of information that passes through to the public. Moreover, 
let c* be the expected costs of nuclear power under full information (in the following, we 
ignore benefits that we assume will not be affected by the disaster). Peoples' perceptions 
of the cost prior to the tsunami could then be represented as: 
 
c(–1) = Q x c*.     (5) 
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Thus, entirely transparent countries (Q = 1) correctly perceive c(–1) = c*, whereas 
non-transparent countries (Q = 0) perceive c(–1) = 0. Next, we consider what happens 
after the disaster, distinguishing between three cases.  
 
CASE 1: All information is revealed 
 
This case assumes that the ―full information‖ cost, c*, does not change after the disaster. 
However, it is assumed that the public in all countries can now observe the actual 
potential costs of nuclear power. That is, regardless of transparency, people can obtain 
accurate information regarding the nuclear incident after the incident occurs. The 
emergence and development of cross-border media enables people to obtain the 
information, even in less transparent countries. The supply of information regarding 
nuclear energy is drastically increased when the incident takes place. Hence, the 
amount of information obtained by people via the media, for example, using the Internet, 
is greater after the incident than before. Hence, before the accident, the information 
obtained is considered to largely depend on the degree of transparency. This assumption 
is considered to reflect the real situation in 2011, where the Internet is widely available 
worldwide.   
 
c(0) – c(–1) = c* – Q x c* = c* (1–Q). 
 
Notice that the perceived costs increase in all countries (except those that are fully 
transparent), but more so in the non-transparent countries. Thus, the change in 
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the perceived costs of nuclear power is negatively related to transparency. In terms of 
equations (4) and (5), this implies that c1 > 0 and b2 > 0. From this, I propose 
Hypothesis 1. 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
Views regarding nuclear energy are less likely to change in more transparent countries 
even after the occurrence of a nuclear accident. 
 
CASE 2: Shock to cost and imperfect pass-through 
 
This case assumes that the disaster resulted in a general shock, w, to the ―full 
information‖ cost of nuclear power, i.e., costs increase to c* + w. However, a lack of 
transparency implies that this is not fully revealed in all countries. In contrast to CASE 
1, cross-border media has not been well developed and people are unable to obtain 
information via cross-border media. Therefore, transparency of country is considered to 
influence the circulation of information after the incident occurs. Thus:  
 
c(0) – c(–1) = Q x (c* + w) – Q x c* = Q x w. 
 
This means that perceived costs increase in all countries, but in contrast to CASE 1 the 
change is greater in more transparent societies. Thus, the change in the perceived costs 
of nuclear power is positively related to transparency. In terms of equations (4) and (5), 
this implies that c1 < 0 and b2 < 0. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is postulated as follows:  
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Hypothesis 2: 
Views regarding nuclear energy are more likely to change in more transparent 
countries after the occurrence of a nuclear accident. 
 
CASE 3: Shock to cost and perfect pass-through of shock 
 
This case is similar to CASE 2, but it is now assumed that the shock—and only the 
shock—is fully observed in all countries. In this situation, cross-border media has not 
been sufficiently developed, nor is it widespread, although some media is present. 
Hence, people do receive information regarding the shock, but not regarding nuclear 
energy.  
 
c(0) – c(–1) = Q x c* + w – Q x c* = w. 
 
Now the perceived cost increases in all countries by the same amount, w. Moreover, 
transparency has no effect on the change, i.e., c1 = b2 = 0. This leads to Hypothesis 3. 
 
Hypothesis 3: 
Views regarding nuclear energy are affected by transparency even after the occurrence 
of a nuclear accident. 
 
3. Data and Specification  
In March 2011, approximately two weeks after Japan’s natural disaster, 
WIN-Gallup International (2011) conducted a survey regarding nuclear energy in 47 
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countries. The survey contained the following questions: "What was your view about 
nuclear energy prior to the Japan earthquake?" and "What was your view about nuclear 
energy after the Japan earthquake?" Respondents were given two response options: 
"favorable" or "unfavorable". The results regarding the favoring of nuclear energy before 
and after the natural disaster in each county are available from WIN-Gallup 
International (2011)2. The data from this survey were used to calculate any changes in 
the rate of favoring nuclear energy and the results are presented in Table 1. With the 
exception of Azerbaijan, Fiji, Morocco, South Africa, and Spain, the rates of favoring 
nuclear energy are represented by a negative value for the surveyed countries. These 
results suggest that the nuclear accident in Japan has made people more cautious about 
nuclear energy. Thus, the accident has had an obvious impact on views regarding 
nuclear energy worldwide. Respondents may, however, not accurately recall what their 
views on the matter were prior to the incident. Further, their post-earthquake view may 
have been only temporarily affected. These possibilities can result in measurement 
errors, which will then bias the estimation results. This bias, however, is expected to 
work in the opposite direction, as it will push the coefficient estimates downwards. 
When coefficient estimates are biased downwards, this is formally known as 
attenuation bias. Hence, what I estimate in the presence of measurement error is in fact 
less in magnitude than the true effect. Further, if the measurement errors do not vary 
systematically across the countries, then the measurement error does not necessary 
pose a great problem. 
The frequency with which government-update data is available to the public is 
used to represent government transparency (Islam 2006). Therefore, government 
                                                   
2 It is available at http://www.nrc.co.jp/report/pdf/110420_2.pdf (accessed 29 April  
2011). 
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transparency plays a significant role in forming the prior knowledge of citizens. For the 
11 representative economic variables, Islam (2006) observed the actual frequency level 
with which the data are published to create the index of government transparency 
(TRANS). However, non-economic factors are not taken into account in creating the 
index because the index is calculated using economic variables. Thus, non-economic 
factors, such as political issues and whether a Freedom of Information Act (FOI) has 
been adopted, should be also considered when creating the index. That is, ―the 
transparency index indicates how much economic information governments are willing 
to disclose—but the FOI law gives access to more than just economic data‖ (Islam 2006, 
131). To this end, Islam (2006) constructed two alternative measures of government 
transparency, TRANS1 and TRANS2. TRANS1 combines TRANS and a dummy for the 
adoption of the FOI. TRANS2 is a linear combination of TRANS and a measure for the 
length of time that FOI has been enacted. Citizens’ knowledge of nuclear energy is 
considered to depend on political accountability. As a robustness check on the impact of 
government transparency (considered as an effect of citizens’ prior knowledge), this 
paper uses TRANS, TRANS1, and TRANS2 as proxies for government transparency.  
Definitions and the basic statistics for the variables used in the estimations are 
presented in Table 2. The estimated function takes the following form: 
DVIEWi = 0 + 1TRANSi + 2BVIEWi + 3NCLEARi + 4Ln(POP)i + 5GDPi + 
6GOVSIZi + 7EASIAi + 8EUROPi + 9NDISi + uit,  
where DVIEW represents a change in the rate of favoring nuclear energy before 
and after the natural disaster in country i,  represents regression parameters and u is 
an error term. The rate of favoring nuclear energy before the natural disaster has been 
included (BVIEW) to control for the initial level of favoring nuclear energy. As nuclear 
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energy plants increase, the likelihood of nuclear accidents also rises. The number of 
nuclear energy plants is included to control for this effect. Economic factors are 
captured by including population, GDP per capital, and government expenditure (% of 
GDP). These data were sourced from the Penn World Table (PWT 6.3) 3. There appears 
to be a negative externality with regard to nuclear leakage caused by natural disaster. 
The possibility of suffering such an externality varies with regard to a nation’s distance 
from Japan. Thus, the location of countries with regard to Japan influences changes in 
views about nuclear energy. Dummies for East Asian countries and European countries 
were incorporated into this model to capture such effects. The experience of natural 
disasters is thought to be related to predictions regarding the outcome of natural 
disasters and, in turn, influence views regarding nuclear power. To capture this effect, 
the total number of disasters that have occurred since 1970 are incorporated in the 
function. 
It is likely that nuclear plants will exist in the countries where people favor 
nuclear energy. The OLS estimation results above possibly suffer from endogeneity bias 
because there appears to be a reverse causality between the dependent variable 
(DVIEW) and independent variable (NCLEAR). To control for this bias, instrumental 
variables were used to conduct the Limited Maximum Likelihood (LIML) Fuller version 
estimation. The building of nuclear energy plants requires sufficient land area. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to find the space to build plants in more densely populated 
countries. Therefore, population density and land area were used as instrumental 
variables in the LIML estimations. Staiger and Stock (1997) and Stock and Yogo (2005) 
show that the estimates are likely to be biased if the instruments in a regression are 
                                                   
3 The data are available from the Center of International Comparisons at the 
University of Pennsylvania. http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ (accessed 28 March 2011).  
14 
 
only weakly correlated with the suspected endogenous variables. The LIML Fuller 
version of the instrumental variable methods is robust with weak instruments. 
Furthermore, as the sample size in this paper is only 45, it can be considered a small 
sample. LIML estimates are robust with small samples, and so the risk of a significantly 
large bias is minor. Data were obtained from the World Development Indicators.4 
 
4. Results  
The estimation results for OLS are reported in Table 3. The results for the LIML 
estimation are exhibited in Table 4, while its first-stage results are in Table 5. In each 
table, the results using TRANS as a proxy for government transparency are shown in 
columns (1)–(3), whereas results using TRANS1 and TRANS2 as proxies are in columns 
(4)–(6) and columns (7)–(9), respectively.  
First, I will discuss the results in Table 3. The results for TRANS, TRANS1 and 
TRANS2 yielded positive signs and were statistically significant in all estimations. The 
absolute values for TRANS ranged between 1.73 and 1.76, indicating that a 1-point 
increase in the government transparency index increased DVIEW by 1.73%–1.76%. It 
follows from this that the influence of government transparency does not vary according 
to specifications. Results for TRANS1 and TRANS2 are similar to those of TRANS. This 
implies that citizens’ views regarding nuclear energy were less likely to be influenced by 
the Fukushima accident with a more transparent government. Further, the signs for 
the coefficients of BVIEW are negative and statistically significant in all columns. Its 
absolute values are between 0.14 and 0.16, showing that a 1-point higher BVIEW 
results in an approximately 0.15-point lower DVIEW. I interpreted this result to suggest 
                                                   
4 The data are available from HP of World Bank 
http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do (accessed 28 March 2011). 
15 
 
that citizens who favor nuclear energy were more likely to be affected by the Fukushima 
accident. With the exception of columns (1) and (2), coefficients for GDP yield the 
negative sign while being statistically significant. In my interpretation, this means that 
nuclear energy is necessary for countries with lower GDP levels because citizens in 
these countries are more likely to believe that nuclear energy is necessary for further 
economic development. That is, in less developed countries, the benefit of nuclear 
energy outweighs the cost of nuclear energy (being the negative externality caused by 
the nuclear incident). In contrast, for those countries with higher GDP levels, citizens 
are more inclined to believe that the negative externality of nuclear energy outweighs 
its benefit (being to further economic growth). Most of the other control variables were 
not statistically significant and did not affect changes in views regarding nuclear 
energy. 
With regard to the LIML estimation results exhibited in Table 4, an 
over-identification test provided a method of testing for exogeneity in instrumental 
variables. Test statistics were not significant in columns (1)-(9) and, therefore, do not 
reject the null hypothesis that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the 
error term. This suggests that the instrumental variables are valid. Further, an 
endogeneity test shows whether LIML is even necessary. Test statistics were not 
significant in columns (1)–(9) and do not reject the null hypothesis that NCLEAR is 
uncorrelated with the error term. Accordingly, the number of nuclear plants is not an 
endogenous independent variable when DVIEW is the dependent variable. This 
suggests that OLS is valid and so LIML is not necessary. However, to check the 
robustness of the OLS results, the LIML results are exhibited. In Table 5, the first-stage 
results show that the coefficients for land area take the predicted positive sign, whereas 
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the coefficients for population density take the expected negative sign. Further, the 
coefficients for population density are statistically significant in all columns, although 
those for land area are not statistically significant. The results for the instrumental 
variables are consistent with the prediction. In all columns in Table 4, TRANS, TRANS1, 
and TRANS2 yielded a significant positive sign, which is similar to the results in Table 
3. Coefficients for BVIEW and GDP produced negative signs, while being statistically 
significant in all estimations. All in all, the results in Table 4 are very similar to those in 
Table 3. The estimation results are considered to be robust. These results strongly 
support Hypothesis 1. 
The above evidence can be interpreted to indicate that citizens’ views were not 
influenced by the Fukushima incident in countries with more transparent governments. 
Thus, it can be argued that government transparency played a critical role in the 
formation of views regarding nuclear energy before the Fukushima incident. This is so 
because information regarding nuclear energy after the Fukushima incident did not 
change their views, which is consistent with previous research on political persuasion 
(e.g., Zaller 1992; Prior 2006; Enikolopov et al., 2009). 
In the case where cross-border media does not exist, governments can enjoy 
monopolistic power in the ―information market‖. Even if domestic media exists, 
governments can still exercise strict control over the media. Hence, transparency 
reduces the benefit to governments. In other words, the monopolistic power of 
governments over the ―information market‖ reduces the incentive to become 
transparent. Furthermore, as suggested by the simple model, transparency reduced the 
benefit to citizens. The role of transparency becomes important when cross-border 
media, such as the Internet, is used worldwide. Because of the media, it is difficult for 
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governments to conceal and manipulate information. That is, governments lose 
monopolistic power in the ―information market‖ because the ―spread of the Internet‖ has 
made the market competitive. Such competitive pressure increases the incentive of 
governments to become more transparent. To put it another way, transparency leads to 
an increase in the benefit to governments, such as support by citizens. In contrast, as 
exhibited in the basic model, transparency increases the benefit to citizens. 
 
5. Conclusions 
News of the Fukushima incident, as a result of a natural disaster, increased the 
level of information released regarding nuclear energy via various media sources. Even 
in countries where information is restricted or controlled by government, there was a 
cross-border information flow via the Internet, enabling citizens to access information. 
The Fukushima incident renewed the debate regarding the issue of nuclear energy. The 
views of citizens regarding nuclear energy are thus believed to have been affected by the 
Fukushima incident. This study used cross-country data from 45 countries to examine 
how government transparency influenced changes in views regarding nuclear energy 
before and after the 2011 Japanese disasters. It was observed that in the majority of 
countries studied in this paper that the rate of favoring nuclear energy declined after 
the disaster. However, empirical results have shown that this rate is less likely to 
decrease when governments more frequently update the data to be released to the 
public, although the rate of favoring nuclear energy declined after the disaster in the 
majority of countries. 
This finding clearly states that views regarding nuclear energy were less elastic 
to the news of the Fukushima incident in situations where people already held 
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supportive views about the nuclear energy as a result of information provided by their 
government before the incident. This is in line with belief-based models of persuasion 
(DellaVigna and Gentzkov, 2010). Based on this key finding, I derive the argument that 
not only citizens but also governments can increase the benefit of transparency. The 
importance of transparency, however, appears to depend on the condition of the 
―information market‖. The development and diffusion of cross-border media has created 
a competitive information market, resulting in greater benefits from transparency for 
both citizens and governments. In other words, government transparency has become 
more important than ever before, not only for citizens but also for governments. 
The sample of data used in this paper is very small and aggregated. For a closer 
examination of the effect of the incident on citizens’ views, individual-level data are 
required, and as such individual data should be used to examine the hypotheses raised 
in this paper. This remaining issue is to be addressed in future work. 
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Table 1  Change in views regarding nuclear energy  
(rate of favoring nuclear energy after a natural disaster) – (rate of favoring nuclear 
energy before a natural disaster) 
 
Country Difference Country Difference 
Austria –4 Italy –4 
Azerbaijan 3 Japan –23 
Bangladesh –13 Kenya –11 
Belgium –9 South Korea  –1 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
–3 Latvia –1 
Brazil –2 Macedonia –2 
Bulgaria –6 Morocco 19 
Cameroon –4 Netherlands –7 
Canada –8 Nigeria –2 
China –13 Pakistan –2 
Colombia –1 Palestine –9 
Czech –2 Poland –6 
Egypt –13 Romania –10 
Fiji 1 Russia –11 
Finland –6 Saudi Arabia –9 
France –8 Serbia –4 
Georgia –9 South Africa 4 
Germany –8 Spain 2 
Greece –2 Switzerland –6 
Hong Kong –8 Tunisia –5 
Iceland –6 Turkey –4 
India –9 United States –6 
Iraq –13 Vietnam –5 
Ireland –4   
Note: Serbia and Palestine are excluded in the regression estimation because 
independent variable data was not available. 
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Table 2  Definition of variables and its descriptive statistics 
Note: BVIEW, AVIEW and DVIEW were obtained from WIN-Gallup International 
(2011). TRANS was sourced from Islam (2006) and NCLEAR from HP of European 
nuclear society (http://www.euronuclear.org/info/npp-ww.htm accessed at April 30, 
2011). POP, GDP and GOVSIZ were obtained from Penn World Table 6.3. 
(http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php. accessed at April 30, 2011). NDIS 
was obtained from the International Disaster Database (http://www.emdat.be. 
accessed at April 30, 2011).  
 
 
 Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
BVIEW Rate of favoring nuclear energy before earthquake 
(%) 
44.5 17.4 
AVIEW Rate of favoring nuclear energy after earthquake 
(%) 
39.2 15.3 
DVIEW AVIEW – BVIEW 
(%) 
–5.3 6.1 
TRANS Government transparency indicator: 
1(low)–6(high) 
5.1 1.0 
TRANS1 TRANS + dummy for Freedom of Information Act: 
1(low)–7(high) 
5.7 1.4 
TRANS2 TRANS + measure of length of time country has 
had Freedom of Information Act: 1(low)–11(high) 
6.3 2.2 
NCLEAR Number of nuclear power plants in operation 7.7 19.1 
POP Population (Millions) 101.5 251.1 
GDP GDP per capita (million dollars) 1.9 1.4 
GOVSIZ Government expenditure of GDP (%) 16.0 8.4 
NDIS Total number of natural disasters since 1970 96.5 139.9 
EASIA Dummies for East Asian countries (Japan, China, 
and Korea). 
--- --- 
EUROP Dummies for European countries. --- --- 
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Table 3  OLS estimation 
Dependent variable: DVIEW(the difference in views regarding nuclear energy)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by robust standard errors. * and ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% 
levels, respectively. 
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
TRANS 
 
1.73** 
(2.18) 
1.73** 
(2.20) 
1.76** 
(2.14) 
      
TRANS1 
 
   1.60** 
(2.54) 
1.59** 
(2.51) 
1.60** 
(2.55) 
   
TRANS2 
 
      0.97* 
(1.83) 
0.97* 
(1.87) 
0.96* 
(1.86) 
BVIEW 
 
-0.14* 
(-2.01) 
-0.14** 
(-2.05) 
-0.14** 
(-2.09) 
-0.15** 
(-2.17) 
-0.15** 
(-2.21) 
-0.15** 
(-2.24) 
-0.16** 
(-2.15) 
-0.16** 
(-2.18) 
-0.16** 
(-2.20) 
NCLEAR 
 
-0.01 
(-0.24) 
-0.01 
(-0.33) 
-0.01 
(-0.36) 
-0.02 
(-0.43) 
-0.02 
(-0.52) 
-0.02 
(-0.60) 
-0.04 
(-0.72) 
-0.04 
(-0.94) 
-0.04 
(-1.02) 
Ln (POP) 
 
-0.57 
(-0.97) 
-0.59 
(-1.20) 
-0.59 
(-1.21) 
-0.47 
(-0.89) 
-0.45 
(-1.02) 
-0.43 
(-0.98) 
-0.35 
(-0.68) 
-0.37 
(-0.93) 
-0.35 
(-0.87) 
GDP 
 
-1.21 
(-1.52) 
-1.22 
(-1.52) 
-1.17* 
(-1.83) 
-1.38* 
(-1.73) 
-1.37* 
(-1.69) 
-1.17* 
(-1.88) 
-1.43* 
(-1.71) 
-1.43* 
(-1.74) 
-1.20* 
(-1.83) 
GOVSIZ 
 
-0.01 
(-0.13) 
-0.01 
(-0.14) 
 -0.05 
(-0.45) 
-0.05 
(-0.45) 
 -0.05 
(-0.50) 
-0.05 
(-0.52) 
 
EASIA 
 
-3.68 
(-0.60) 
-3.70 
(-0.64) 
-3.76 
(-0.66) 
-3.85 
(-0.64) 
-3.82 
(-0.67) 
-3.97 
(-0.71) 
-2.42 
(-0.43) 
-2.44 
(-0.46) 
-2.62 
(-0.50) 
EUROP 
 
-2.64 
(-1.49) 
-2.62 
(-1.64) 
-2.76 
(-1.62) 
-2.83 
(-1.55) 
-2.85* 
(-1.70) 
-3.21* 
(-1.81) 
-2.11 
(-1.19) 
-2.09 
(-1.29) 
-2.49 
(-1.48) 
NDIS 
 
-0.45*103 
(-0.04) 
  0.65*103 
(0.07) 
  -0.46*103 
(-0.05) 
  
Constant 
 
2.47 
(0.44) 
2.63 
(0.45) 
2.17 
(0.43) 
2.85 
(0.50) 
2.62 
(0.44) 
1.43 
(0.27) 
4.70 
(0.83) 
4.87 
(0.80) 
3.53 
(0.66) 
Adjusted R2 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.36 
Observations 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
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Table 4  LIML estimation 
Dependent variable: DVIEW(the difference in views regarding nuclear energy)  
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9) 
TRANS 
 
1.65** 
(2.24) 
1.71** 
(2.37) 
1.77** 
(2.33) 
      
TRANS1 
 
   1.33** 
(2.17) 
1.45** 
(2.36) 
1.46** 
(2.38) 
   
TRANS2 
 
      0.71* 
(1.75) 
0.7９* 
(1.77) 
0.79* 
(1.72) 
BVIEW 
 
-0.15*** 
(-2.61) 
-0.15** 
(-2.49) 
-0.15** 
(-2.50) 
-0.17*** 
(-2.83) 
-0.16*** 
(-2.71) 
-0.16*** 
(-2.70) 
-0.17*** 
(-2.73) 
-0.17*** 
(-2.63) 
-0.16*** 
(-2.61) 
NCLEAR 
 
0.08* 
(1.79) 
0.04 
(0.67) 
0.04 
(0.59) 
0.10** 
(2.07) 
0.05 
(0.77) 
0.05 
(0.66) 
0.06 
(1.24) 
0.02 
(0.31) 
0.01 
(0.19) 
Ln (POP) 
 
-0.68 
(-1.24) 
-0.88* 
(-1.72) 
-0.86* 
(-1.67) 
-0.58 
(-1.16) 
-0.82* 
(-1.75) 
-0.77 
(-1.64) 
-0.43 
(-0.89) 
-0.63 
(-1.46) 
-0.59 
(-1.33) 
GDP 
 
-1.82** 
(-2.31) 
-1.72* 
(-1.86) 
-1.58** 
(-2.14) 
-2.02*** 
(-2.65) 
-1.96** 
(-2.16) 
-1.65** 
(-2.39) 
-1.80** 
(-2.43) 
-1.76** 
(-2.23) 
-1.45** 
(-2.42) 
GOVSIZ 
 
-0.03 
(-0.26) 
-0.03 
(-0.31) 
 -0.06 
(-0.60) 
-0.07 
(-0.68) 
 -0.06 
(-0.61) 
-0.07 
(-0.69) 
 
EASIA 
 
-3.43 
(-0.55) 
-3.72 
(-0.67) 
-3.83 
(-0.68) 
-3.44 
(-0.54) 
-3.79 
(-0.67) 
-4.01 
(-0.70) 
-2.38 
(-0.41) 
-2.59 
(-0.49) 
-2.81 
(-0.53) 
EUROP 
 
-2.48 
(-1.45) 
-2.33 
(-1.49) 
-2.61* 
(-1.66) 
-2.47 
(-1.37) 
-2.36 
(-1.39) 
-2.89* 
(-1.71) 
-1.84 
(-1.13) 
-1.70 
(-1.12) 
-2.23 
(-1.45) 
NDIS 
 
-0.007 
(-0.83) 
  -0.007 
(-0.86) 
  -0.006 
(-0.82) 
  
Constant 
 
5.61 
(1.05) 
6.67 
(1.08) 
5.48 
(1.08) 
7.21 
(1.29) 
8.28 
(1.26) 
6.27 
(1.12) 
8.16 
(1.58) 
9.24 
(1.47) 
7.27 
(1.34) 
Over-identifi
cation  
test 
0.50 
P-value 
=0.47 
1.19 
P-value 
=0.27 
1.34 
P-value 
=0.24 
0.47 
P-value 
=0.49 
1.13 
P-value 
=0.28 
1.35 
P-value 
=0.24 
0.44 
P-value 
=0.50 
1.15 
P-value 
=0.28 
1.41 
P-value=0.
23 
Endogeneity 
test  
1.67 
P-value 
=0.19 
0.90 
P-value 
=0.34 
0.80 
P-value 
=0.37 
1.80 
P-value 
=0.17 
0.94 
P-value 
=0.33 
0.76 
P-value 
=0.38 
1.86 
P-value 
=0.17 
0.88 
P-value 
=0.34 
0.70 
P-value 
=0.40 
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Note: Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by robust standard errors obtained. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Instrumental variables are population density and land area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Centered R2 0.19 0.33 0.33 0.29 0.33 0.33    
Observations   45 45 45   45 45 45    
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Table 5  LIML estimation (First Stage) 
Dependent variable: NCLEAR (Number of nuclear plants)  
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9) 
Land area 
 
0.38 
(0.36) 
1.00 
(0.96) 
1.07 
(1.06) 
0.26 
(0.25) 
0.92 
(0.90) 
0.97 
(0.97) 
0.20 
(0.19) 
0.78 
(0.79) 
0.82 
(0.85) 
Population  
density 
-4.51** 
(-2.34) 
-4.05* 
(-1.82) 
-4.07* 
(-1.84) 
-4.71** 
(-2.39) 
-4.19* 
(-1.84) 
-4.23** 
(-2.12) 
-4.20** 
(-2.37) 
-3.75* 
(-1.79) 
-3.77* 
(-1.81) 
TRANS 
 
0.61 
(0.31) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
-0.43 
(-0.19) 
      
TRANS1 
 
   2.24 
(1.08) 
1.57 
(0.85) 
1.57 
(0.87) 
   
TRANS2 
 
      2.19 
(1.27) 
2.30 
(1.39) 
2.35 
(1.43) 
BVIEW 
 
0.14 
(1.11) 
0.13 
(1.03) 
0.13 
(0.99) 
0.14 
(1.12) 
0.14 
(1.09) 
0.13 
(1.07) 
0.12 
(1.02) 
0.12 
(1.02) 
0.12 
(0.99) 
Ln (POP) 
 
0.34 
(0.17) 
3.23* 
(1.82) 
3.24* 
(1.84) 
0.11 
(0.05) 
3.06* 
(1.82) 
3.00* 
(1.81) 
0.19 
(0.10) 
2.89* 
(1.84) 
2.83* 
(1.83) 
GDP 
 
7.01** 
(2.46) 
8.56* 
(1.88) 
7.98* 
(1.87) 
6.07** 
(2.37) 
7.76* 
(1.83) 
7.02* 
(1.83) 
4.84* 
(1.72) 
6.01 
(1.57) 
5.30 
(1.55) 
GOVSIZ 
 
0.10 
(0.54) 
0.22 
(1.32) 
 0.08 
(0.46) 
0.22 
(1.26) 
 0.06 
(0.37) 
0.19 
(1.11) 
 
EASIA 
 
-3.86 
(-0.18) 
-0.27 
(-0.02) 
0.57 
(0.03) 
-4.94 
(-0.24) 
-1.13 
(-0.06) 
-0.41 
(-0.02) 
-2.16 
(-0.11) 
1.14 
(0.07) 
1.80 
(0.11) 
EUROP 
 
-5.13 
(-0.67) 
-7.40 
(-0.82) 
-5.68 
(-0.70) 
-6.68 
(-0.84) 
-8.87 
(-0.92) 
-7.39 
(-0.84) 
-5.70 
(-0.82) 
-8.40 
(-0.92) 
-7.13 
(-0.85) 
NDIS 
 
0.06 
(1.37) 
  0.06 
(1.46) 
  0.06 
(1.38) 
  
Constant 
 
23.1 
(0.87) 
-47.8** 
(-2.09) 
-41.7** 
(-2.00) 
-27.4 
(-1.05) 
-52.9** 
(-2.17) 
-47.9** 
(-2.12) 
-26.4 
(-1.11) 
-52.6** 
(-2.27) 
-48.4** 
(-2.22) 
F-test F=3.89 
P-value 
=0.03 
F=1.78 
P-value 
=0.18 
F=1.84 
P-value 
=0.17 
F=4.01 
P-value 
=0.02 
F=1.81 
P-value 
=0.17 
F=1.84 
P-value 
=0.17 
F=3.53 
P-value 
=0.04 
F=1.64 
P-value 
=0.20 
F=1.68 
P-value 
=0.20 
Partial R2 of 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.08 
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Note: Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by robust standard errors. * and ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% 
levels, respectively. Instrumental variables are population density and land area.  
 
excluded 
instruments 
Observations   45 45 45 45      
